The purpose of this study was to determine whether certain self-discrepancies predicted the extent to which individuals experienced suicidal ideation. The Selves Questionnaire (an idiographic measure of self-beliefs) was administered to 152 undergraduate participants, who also completed measures of hopelessness, depression, and suicidal ideation. Three kinds of self-discrepancies were associated with suicidal ideation: actual:ideal, actual:ought, and actual:ideal:future. Covariance structure analyses indicated a best-fitting model suggesting that, actual:ideal and actual:ideal:future self-discrepancies contribute to hopelessness, which in turn contributes to depression and suicidal (...) ideation. The findings suggest that self-discrepancy, as a form of negative self-evaluation, may contribute to an individual's risk for suicidal ideation. Moreover, the findings point to an integration of self-discrepancy theory with hopelessness theory. (shrink)

In a recent BioEssays paper [W. F. Martin, BioEssays 2017, 39, 1700115], William Martin sharply criticizes evolutionary interpretations that involve lateral gene transfer into eukaryotic genomes. Most published examples of LGTs in eukaryotes, he suggests, are in fact contaminants, ancestral genes that have been lost from other extant lineages, or the result of artefactual phylogenetic inferences. Martin argues that, except for transfers that occurred from endosymbiotic organelles, eukaryote LGT is insignificant. Here, in reviewing this field, we seek to correct some (...) of the misconceptions presented therein with regard to the evidence for LGT in eukaryotes. A recent paper dismisses claims of lateral gene transfer into eukaryotic genomes. We counter the arguments made in that paper and discuss the extensive evidence for LGT in eukaryotes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gender Ideology and the “Artistic” Fabrication of Human Sex: Nature as Norm or the Remaking of the Human?Michele M. SchumacherUntil quite recently,” the famous English novelist C. S. Lewis remarked in 1959, “it was taken for granted that the business of the artist was to delight and instruct his public”: that is to say, to address simultaneously their passions and their intellects. “There were, of course, different publics.... And (...) an artist might lead his public on to appreciate finer things than they had wanted at first; but he could do this only by being; from the first, if not merely entertaining, yet entertaining, and if not completely intelligible, yet very largely intelligible.” This constraint—let us call it intelligent (or purposeful) design, in keeping with a basic analogy that we will draw upon in these pages—had however been lost, Lewis observed. Hence, even “in the highest aesthetic circles one now hears nothing about the artist’s duty to us. It is all about our duty to him. He owes us nothing; we owe him ‘recognition,’ even though he has never paid the slightest attention to our tastes, interests, or habits.”1 In short, the artist of modernity need not pay the slightest attention to an intention, not even his own. Modern art need not be an expression of intelligence or [End Page 363] understanding; it is expression as such (tout court): personal and autonomous.2Lewis’s remarks do not point merely to the increasingly relativist tendencies of art in the Western world, to the lack of objective criteria or norms governing the artistic disciplines. They also point to the growing disregard among artists for the sociocultural expectations of their publicum. Mediating between the two is, without a doubt, the basis upon which both artistic and social norms were traditionally founded: nature, which served as a classic analogy for both art (understood in the broad sense, so as to include not only the fine arts, but also technology and practical sciences) and ethics in virtue of nature’s intrinsic inclination towards its defining end and perfection.With regard to the first of these analogies (that of art and nature), Mark Schiefsky explains that although art does bring about “results that nature itself cannot,” it does so in the classic understanding “by acting in a natural way—the way nature would act if it could generate the products of art.”3 As for the difference between the two, nature is moved to its specifying end by way of intrinsic inclinations that are implicit to it, whereas a work of art is moved to its end extrinsically, and thus with more or less violence.4 A sculptor, for example, who introduces a form into a piece of marble, does so by chiseling [End Page 364] and hammering away at the fine stone.5 “Art is,” Aristotle explains, “the principle and form of the thing that comes to be [let us say, a sculpture]; but it is located elsewhere [in, for example, the artist’s mind or in a sketch that he has made] than in that thing, whereas the movement of nature is located in the thing itself that comes to be [a tree, for example, or a baby], and is derived from another natural organism [a tree or human parents] which possessed the form in actuality.”6This classic distinction between art and nature parallels the distinction between art and ethics. Ethics “does not affect human action in the same way as do art and technique,” Servais Pinckaers explains. Unlike art and technique, which are concerned with “the external work produced by human action”—this painting or that machine, for example—ethics is concerned with an immanent principle, qualifying the actor as such: the stable dispositions (or habitus: virtues or vices) at the origin of “the active willing that is the principle source of the action.”7 This immanent principle at the source of ethical action is—to complete our analogy—creative in only a limited sense. The human person is indeed free to choose, but he or she is not free to decide “what is good or evil” as such, nor what is “good or bad for... (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to the phenomenon of warranted epistemic blame in order to pose a challenge for most forms of epistemic instrumentalism, which is the view that all of the demands of epistemic normativity are requirements of instrumental rationality. Because of the way in which the instrumentalist takes the force of one’s epistemic reasons to derive from one’s own individually held ends, the instrumentalist faces unique difficulties in explaining our standing to blame one another for violations of (...) epistemic norms. In many cases, it is unclear why, according to the instrumentalist, we might be entitled to others’ adherence to epistemic norms at all. This is a serious problem. The upshot is that theorists of epistemic normativity should be prepared reject most forms of epistemic instrumentalism. (shrink)

A lexicon of Hebrew terms and their Romance equivalents from Maimónides’ treatise on logic and philosophy, al-Maqālah fi-ṣināʻat al-manṭiq, circulated in Hebrew aljamiado among Jews and conversos immersed in 15th-century humanism. This lexicon is one of several texts included in a manuscript which also includes literary works by converso authors such as Alfonso de la Torre’s Visión deleytable and Alfonso de Cartagena’s translation of sentenciae by Seneca, as well as three other philosophical lexicons. This collection of texts recorded in MS (...) Parma 2666 reveals that 15th-century Jews and/or conversos –the only people capable of reading the Hebrew aljamiado– read and interpreted De la Torre’s Visión in the context of the Judeo-Arabic philosophical tradition, which is also the basis for Maimónides’ Manṭiq, available in Hebrew and Latin translations. In this article I examine how the philosophic vocabulary developed in al-Manṭiq, accessible in Romance in the lexicons in MS Parma 2666, reflects the Maimonidean epistemology as it survived and developed among 15th-century Jewish and converso readers of the Visión deleytable. (shrink)

Are epistemic reasons merely a species of instrumental practical reasons, making epistemic rationality a specialized form of instrumental practical rationality? Or are epistemic reasons importantly different in kind? Despite the attractions of the former view, Kelly (2003) argues quite compellingly that epistemic rationality cannot be merely a matter of taking effective means to one’s epistemic ends. I argue here that Kelly’s objections can be sidestepped if we understand epistemic reasons as instrumental reasons that arise in light of the aims held (...) by social collectives of which we are members, rather than being fixed by our own individual goals. This social version of epistemic instrumentalism would not be subject to counterexamples that point to the failure of individual people to possess desires or goals that would account for all of the epistemic reasons we find it natural to attribute to them. I conclude by comparing the proposed view to the alternative version of instrumentalism defended by Kornblith (1993). I argue that the social view I sketch here has one noteworthy advantage. It better accounts for the intuitive distinctness of our practical and epistemic reasons for belief in cases where flouting epistemic norms would better help us to achieve our own individual goals. (shrink)

We propose six guideposts that states and hospitals should follow to respect disability rights when designing policies for the allocation of scarce, lifesaving medical treatments. Four relate to criteria for decisions. First, do not use categorical exclusions, especially ones based on disability or diagnosis. Second, do not use perceived quality of life. Third, use hospital survival and near-term prognosis (e.g., death expected within a few years despite treatment) but not long-term life expectancy. Fourth, when patients who use ventilators in their (...) daily lives (e.g., home ventilation) present to acute care hospitals, their personal ventilators should not be reallocated to other patients. Fifth, designate triage officers to assess patients individually on the basis of objective medical evidence, not stereotypes or assumptions. Sixth, include disability rights advocates in policy development and dissemination. (shrink)

The author argues that well-known forms of relativism are unable to accommodate, at once, a set of three highly intuitive theses about the distinctive character of moral reasons. Yet the author argues it is possible to formulate a novel form of normative relativism that has the power to accommodate these claims. The proposed view combines the relativist idea that the normative facts are attitude-dependent with the insight that there are non-human agents to which it makes sense to attribute the kinds (...) of attitudes that give rise to normative reasons. Societies, too, can possess reasons to pursue their aims. What distinguishes moral reasons from reasons of practical rationality is that the former apply directly to societies in virtue of aims held by each society as a group, while the latter apply directly to persons in light of their own individual interests. (shrink)

Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma” is a well-known epistemological objection to moral realism. In this paper, I argue that “third-factor” replies to this argument on behalf of the moral realist, as popularized by Enoch :413–438, 2010, Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), Skarsaune :229–243, 2011) and Wielenberg :441–464, 2010, Robust ethics: the metaphysics and epistemology of godless normative realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), cannot succeed. This is because they are instances of the illegitimate form (...) of reasoning known as “bootstrapping.” The phenomenon of bootstrapping has been discussed in detail, most notably by Vogel :602–623, 2000) and Cohen :309–329, 2002), in a different context as an objection to reliabilism and related theories of knowledge. I introduce four different characterizations of the error of bootstrapping from the epistemic literature in order to argue that the form of reasoning exemplified by third-factor replies would be deemed illegitimate by every one of them. I conclude that the moral realist should abandon third-factor replies, or else suggest a novel diagnosis for what goes wrong in bootstrapping cases that does not apply equally to the realist’s form of argument. However, I am not optimistic about the prospects for this latter strategy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Legislation recently adopted by the United States Congress provides producers of pandemic vaccines with near‐total immunity from civil lawsuits without making individuals injured by those vaccines eligible for compensation through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The unusual decision not to provide an alternative mechanism for compensation is indicative of a broader problem of inconsistency in the American approach to vaccine‐injury compensation policy. Compensation policies have tended to reflect political pressures and economic considerations more than any cognizable set of principles. (...) This article identifies a set of ethical principles bearing on the circumstances in which vaccine injuries should be compensated, both inside and outside public health emergencies. A series of possible bases for compensation rules, some grounded in utilitarianism and some nonconsequentialist, are discussed and evaluated. Principles of fairness and reasonableness are found to constitute the strongest bases. An ethically defensible compensation policy grounded in these principles would make a compensation fund available to all individuals with severe injuries and to individuals with less‐severe injuries whenever the vaccination was required by law or professional duty. (shrink)

Trust is a key component in delivering quality and respectful care within health care systems. However, a growing lack of confidence in health care, particularly among specific subgroups of the population in the United States, could further widen health disparities. In this essay, we explore one approach to building trust and reaching diverse communities to promote health: engaging community‐based organizations (CBOs) as trusted community messengers. We present case studies of partnerships in health promotion, community education, and outreach that showcase how (...) CBOs’ programs build and leverage trust in health care systems through their workforce, services, and engagement with the community. (shrink)

The relationship between psychological research and the development of social policy is controversial, as is any discussion of the role of values and morals within science. Three particular instances of this controversy are evident in psychological research conducted on affirmative action, child abuse, and abortion. The American Psychological Association (APA) in fact takes a particular organizational stance on these issues. APA's Ethics Code provides some guidelines for dealing with issues of personal values as they impact psychological research and the development (...) of social policy. An important distinction can be made between the issues psychological research can reasonably address using empirical data and the issues about which psychologists should take a stand. Ethical guidelines can help psychologists make this distinction as well as inform their subsequent actions. One pertinent recommendation is that psychologists, when serving in their professional role, should be clear regarding whether empiricism or personal belief is guiding their public statements. (shrink)

Over the past few decades, public anxiety about how people interact with science has spawned cycles of discourse across a wide range of media, public and private initiatives, and substantial research endeavors. National and international STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) education initiatives and research have addressed how students interact with science and pursue careers in STEM fields. Researchers concerned with adult interaction with science have focused on factors that influence how citizens gather and interpret scientific knowledge and form positions (...) on scientific issues, applications, and/or policy in a politicized democratic milieu. Building from research on how the public interacts with science in and outside of formal education, this study focuses on attitudes toward science among students in 4th, 7th, and 10th grades and their parents. Little research to date has paired the STEM experiences of adults with their children. We find that the extent to which parents are positively oriented toward science significantly shapes their children’s attitudes toward science. Furthermore, between 7th and 10th grades, students with parents holding positive orientations toward science are more likely to sustain positive attitudes toward science. Since the foundation for most adults’ interactions with science develops in the K-12 environment, we demonstrate that the foundation, as expressed in adulthood, may directly affect the ways the next generation of students interacts with science. We offer insights into the importance of developing student learning into the social scientific research on public understanding of science and how important scientific issues of today interplay with society. (shrink)

Fieldwork in Familiar Places challenges the misconceptions about morality, culture, and objectivity that support these skepticisms, to show that we can take ...

The article provides a critical analysis of a postfeminist identity that is emergent in a set of beauty advertisements, called ‘entitled femininity’. Three major discursive themes are identified, which are constitutive of this postfeminist feminine identity: 1) ‘It’s about me!’ focuses on pampering and pleasuring the self; 2) ‘Celebrating femininity’ reclaims and rejoices in feminine stereotypes; and 3) ‘Girling women’ encourages a youthful disposition in women of all ages. The article shows that entitled femininity occupies an ambivalent discursive space, which (...) celebrates as well as repudiates feminism, and re-installs normative gendered stereotypes. The ambivalence, it is argued, contributes to fostering a culture of post-critique, which numbs resistance and deflects criticism. For all its appearances to be pro-women, feminine entitlement based squarely on an entitlement to consume offers a rather limited and problematic vision of femininity and gender equality. (shrink)

Could an entire society count as an agent in its own right? I argue here that it could. While previous defenders of group agency have focused primarily on groups such as states and corporations that exhibit a great deal of formalized internal structure, less attention has been devoted to more loosely structured social groups. I focus on defending the claims that societies can have ends or goals and that they engage in end-directed behavior. I defend this view by responding to (...) three potential objections. The first is the allegation that the attribution of ends to societies would be redundant, given that the properties of any group will supervene upon the properties of the group’s individual human members. The second is the charge that societies are not genuine agents engaged in end-directed actions because their behavior is not under their own direct control. The third is the concern that while it may be useful to speak of societies ‘as if’ they were agents, this does not indicate that societies really act in pursuit of ends. I draw upon a functionalist approach from the philosophy of mind to argue that all three objections can be addressed by the defender of social agency. (shrink)